THE CAMPAIGN IN SYRIA, 1941

The campaign against the Vichy French forces during June and July 1941 was brief but hard fought and involved an advance by the 7th Australian Division against determined resistance through the rugged, mountainous country of Lebanon. The divisional artillery played a dominant role by supporting the infantry with ample and effective fire.

The Division advanced into Syria from northern Palestine on a two-brigade front-one along the coastal route and the other on a parallel route 15 to 20 miles inland. One field regiment was allotted to each brigade, the third being retained under control of the CRA (later Lieut-General F.H. Berryman) to thicken the fire on either flank as required. For every important attack during the campaign at least two regiments were available with a fire plan evolved and controlled by the CRA.

For the Gunners the campaign was full of incidents, shooting and movement. Typical of the work of the FOOs and OPOs was the exploit of Lieutenant Cutler which won him the V.C. He was FOO with a battalion which, after a long approach march, carried out a flank attack at Merdjayoun. The attack met unexpectedly heavy opposition, including tanks, and was repulsed. Undeterred, Cutler and his party evacuated their casualties, repaired their telephone lines, pushed forward and established an OP behind the enemy lines. From this position he was able to direct harassing fire and send back valuable information. Later, under cover of darkness, he managed to extricate himself.

Getting the guns into position in this campaign often called for expert driving and hard work. A surprise night march from Merdjayoun to capture Jessine involved movement over an unreconnoitred, mountainous track with many hairpin bends, at each of which the guns had to be unhooked, winch-hauled up the slope and man-handled around the bend. This process continued through the night and daylight found the guns in action close behind the infantry of the advance guard, which, thus supposed, were able later in the day to overcome the hastily organised enemy and force him to evacuate the town. The CRA had moved to the FOO's position and having seen the situation for himself personally led a patrol to occupy the town.

The guns supporting the Division along the coast route had the unusual experience of engaging an enemy naval sloop which stood in close and attempted to shell our advancing column. Two direct hits were scored by field guns and the sloop withdrew. A more welcome naval association occurred during the attack on Damour, described below, when the fire of the field guns was supplemented by fire from a British naval squadron which engaged area targets indicated by smoke shell from our guns.

The anti-tank gunners encountered Vichy tanks on numerous occasions. A typical action occurred north of Merdjayoun. A troop of 2-pdrs was supporting the advance of a small flanking column when the enemy counterattacked in greatly superior strength and with tanks. The 2-pdrs immediately engaged the tanks and knocked out four. Under cover of this action the infantry successfully withdrew.

The final and most determined resistance was at Damour on the coast, approximately 15 miles south of Beirut. The enemy had selected his position on good ground for defence, which one flank on the coast and the other on the precipitous coastal range. The front was protected by the Damour river, which was fast flowing with steep banks and fordable at only a few places. To break through, a full-scale set-piece attack with two brigades was necessary. The Gunners demonstrated here the 'great punch' of the divisional artillery when the fire of the guns is concentrated and controlled centrally. Sixty-two guns were deployed to support this attack-46 25-pdrs, eight 4.5-inch howitzers and eight 6-inch howitzers of the 212th Medium Battery RA, which was specifically allotted to the Division for the attack. The fire plan included two barrages and a series of timed concentrations with an expenditure of 350 rounds per gun. From the Gunner point of view this operation followed closely the teaching of the School of Artillery. The technique had been practised during training and the result showed that all ranks of the divisional artillery had been well trained and were able, in action, to deliver shells at the right time and place.